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The Financial Accounting Standards Board recently issued
Financial Accounting Standard 123(R), which requires the
fair value of employee stock options to be reported as an
expense on corporate income statements. Mandatory
options expensing was first proposed in the early 1990s,
and the issue has generated considerable debate since that
time. Members of the entrepreneurial and technology
sectors have been particularly vocal critics of mandatory
expensing and, consequently, FAS 123(R).
Some arguments against the FASB's new expensing
standard are quite reasonable, while others seem less valid.
For instance, the valuation methods prescribed in FAS
123(R) are somewhat imprecise. This lends credibility to
claims that mandatory expensing will fail to improve the
reliability of corporate financial statements and will
encourage increased litigation. On the other hand, fears
that mandatory expensing will place start-ups at a
competitive disadvantage relative to established firms seem
overblown, as does the claim that FAS 123(R) will curb the
economic benefits associated with the issuance of stock
options.
Several years are likely to pass before the true impact of
FAS 123(R) is understood. In the meantime, concerned
businesses can adapt to the new regime by taking steps to
minimize the effect of mandatory expensing on earnings.
I. INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STOCK OPTIONS
EXPENSING DEBATE
On December 16, 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB") issued a controversial regulation governing the way U.S.
companies account for employee stock options.' The new rule, known as
Financial Accounting Standard ("FAS") 123(R), requires the fair value of
J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2007.
1 Carrie Johnson, FASB Orders Options Counted as Expenses, WASH. POST, Dec. 17,
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stock options awarded to employees to be reported as an expense on
corporate income statements.2
More than a decade of debate over the merits of options expensing
preceded the adoption of this standard. The FASB first proposed
mandatory expensing of stock-based compensation in the early 1990s, but a
forceful and effective lobbying effort by the business community 3 resulted
in the 1995 implementation of a less-stringent policy known as FAS 123.4
This standard permitted firms to choose between two methods of
accounting for options. The first approach called for companies to report
the fair value of options awarded to employees as an expense, thereby
reducing net income. 5 The second allowed firms to avoid showing options
expenses on their income statements. Instead, it required firms to provide
financial statement footnotes estimating the extent to which option awards
6
would decrease earnings per share. Naturally, the vast majority of U.S.
companies chose the latter method because it did not reduce reported
profits.7
Flexible accounting rules such as FAS 123 have contributed to a
significant increase in the use of options as a form of compensation. The
magnitude of this increase becomes apparent when examining the changes
to compensation of executive-level employees. In 1992, stock options
accounted for twenty-seven percent of the compensation received by the
CEOs of America's 250 largest companies.8 Ten years later, options
comprised sixty percent of CEO pay.9  Initially, the rising popularity of
options was viewed as a positive development. In theory, stock options
gave corporate managers greater motivation to maximize profits and
increase shareholder wealth and more closely aligned the interests of
executives with shareholders. 10
Unfortunately, this theory did not always hold true. An
unprecedented wave of corporate fraud at firms like Enron and WorldCom
revealed the downside of options and other forms of stock-based
compensation. Executives receiving massive option awards had
2 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 123 (revised 2004): Share-Based Payment, at iii-iv (Dec. 2004).
3 Anthony J. Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick Plays: The Book-
Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUMBIA Bus. L. REV. 35, 98 (2003).
4 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 123: Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, at 1 (Oct. 1995).
5 Id. at 4.
6 Id. at 4-5, 14-15.
7 Kevin A. Hassett & Peter J. Wallison, A Troubling Requirement, 27 REGULATION
52(Spring 2004).
8 Roshan Sonthalia, Comment, Shareholder Voting on All Stock Option Plans: An
Unnecessary and Unwise Proposition, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1206 (2004).
91d.
10 Gary S. Becker, Options Are Usfid- But Only If They're Used Right, Bus. WK.,
Aug. 5, 2002, at 26.
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tremendous incentive to increase their firms' stock prices, and some of
them used unethical and illegal means to inflate share values long enough to
exercise their options and realize huge gains."' In the process, they
compromised the long-term viability of their companies and destroyed
billions of dollars in shareholder value.
The arguments proffered by critics of option-based compensation
are bolstered by a Boston Consulting Group ("BCG") study that revealed a
link between corporate fraud and excessive use of options. It found that the
value of the stock options granted to the CEOs of public companies where
fraud occurred was 800% greater than the value of the options awarded to
the CEOs of comparable firms that did not engage in fraudulent activities.
2
Of the factors examined in the BCG study, the value of stock option awards
showed the strongest correlation with instances of fraud. 13
The debate over options expensing, which was relatively quiet for
several years in the late 1990s, intensified following the corporate scandals
of 2001. Proponents of mandatory expensing urged the FASB to revise
FAS 123, claiming that a new standard was necessary to improve the clarity
of corporate financial reports 14 and discourage the excessive use of
options.' 5 Just as they had in the early nineties, members of the business
community fought back. They vigorously defended the use of options and
argued that mandatory expensing would be impractical due to a lack of
reliable valuation models.' 6  This time, however, corporate America's
arguments did not persuade accounting regulators. As a result, mandatory
expensing became a reality with the adoption of FAS 123(R).
The FASB's decision to require that the fair value of options be
reported on corporate income statements has not ended this debate. The
issue of expensing continues to generate significant discussion, particularly
in the entrepreneurial and technological sectors. This Note adds to the
discussion by explaining the requirements of FAS 123(R), evaluating the
appropriateness of the FASB's options expensing policy, and examining
how firms can adapt to the new standard.
1I Id.12 Fat Cats Turn to Low Fat, THE EcoNoMIST, Mar. 5, 2005, at 14.
3 Id.
14 See Zvi Bodie, Robert S. Kaplan & Robert C. Merton, For the Last Time: Stock
Options Are an Expense, HARV. Bus. REV., March 2003, at 63, 68 (arguing that the
practice of disclosing the cost of stock option awards in footnotes distorts financial
statements).
15 See id. at 71 (arguing that, in the absence of mandatory expensing, companies are
encouraged to award stock options rather than alternative forms of compensation).
16 Johnson, supra note 1, at El.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF FAS 123(R)'s REQUIREMENTS AND THE
RATIONALE FOR ITS ADOPTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") possesses
statutory authority to establish financial accounting and reporting standards
for public companies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' The
SEC delegates much of this rulemaking authority to the FASB, a private
sector regulatory body that oversees the accounting industry.18 Once the
FASB establishes standards, the SEC assumes responsibility for
enforcement.1 9 Consequently, the adoption of FAS 123(R) amounted to a
federal mandate requiring firms to report the fair value of employee stock
option awards.
FAS 123(R) was phased-in during the second half of 2005. For
public companies with $25 million or more in annual revenue, the new
options expensing standard became effective during the first quarterly
reporting period after June 15, 2005.20 Public firms with less than $25
million in annual revenue were not required to comply until the first
quarterly reporting period beginning after December 15, 2005. 21 Nonpublic
companies also were permitted to delay the expensing of options until the
fiscal year beginning after December 15.22
A. Calculating the Fair Value of Stock Options under FAS 123(R)
As firms begin complying with FAS 123(R), they face the
challenge of calculating the fair value of options awarded to employees.
Because there is no market for trading employee stock options, firms must
use complex mathematical formulas to determine the options expenses that
appear on their income statements. FAS 123(R) does not require
companies to use a specific formula to estimate the fair value of their option
awards.23 Instead, it identifies six variables that must be included in any
valuation model. These variables are: (1) the exercise price of the option;
(2) the expected term of the option; (3) the current price of the underlying
17 FASB: Facts About FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
18 Id
19 Id.
20 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 123 (revised 2004): Share-Based Payment, at 25 (Dec. 2004). FAS 123(R) became
effective for "public entities that do not file as small business issuers" during the first
interim or annual reporting period that began after June 15, 2005. Id. A small business
issuer is defined as an entity that has annual revenues of less than $25 million; is a U.S.
or Canadian issuer; is not an investment company; and, if the entity is a majority-owned
subsidiary, is owned by a parent company that is also a small business issuer.
21 Id. at 26.
22 id.
23 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 123 (revised 2004): Share-Based Payment, at 41 (Dec. 2004).
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share; (4) the expected volatility of the price of the underlying share for the
expected term of the option; (5) the expected dividends paid on the
underlying share during the expected term of the option; and (6) the risk-
free interest rate for the expected term of the option.2 4 The Black-Scholes
formula and the "binomial" model, two of the best-known option pricing
methods, incorporate each of these variables, and FAS 123(R) specifically
25
mentions them as valuation models that satisfy the FASB's requirements.
Of the six variables, the expected price volatility of the underlying
stock is probably the most difficult to accurately quantify. Past share price
volatility is often used to predict future volatility, but this approach is of
little help to firms that do not have publicly traded stock or have been
publicly traded for a very short period of time. FAS 123(R) addresses this
problem by permitting such firms to estimate the volatility of their shares
using the historical price volatility of other companies in the same line of
26business.
B. The FASB's Rationale for Adopting FAS 123(R)
Although the valuation of employee stock options is not
particularly straightforward or precise, the FASB concluded that the
benefits of requiring firms to expense the fair value of options outweighed
the uncertainties associated with the expensing process. In announcing the
adoption of FAS 123(R), the board cited three reasons for its new standard.
First, it felt that mandatory expensing was necessary to ensure that
corporate financial statements more accurately reflected economic reality .27
FASB members were concerned that, in the absence of mandatory
expensing, firms were compensating employees with options that had
economic value but were not including the cost of such compensation in the
calculation of net income. In other words, firms that did not expense
employee stock options were overstating their earnings. Second, option
expensing was mandated in order to make earnings reports more
comparable.2 8 Requiring all companies to report the fair value of option
awards spares investors the hassle of trying to compare a firm that expenses
its options with one that does not. Finally, mandatory expensing was
adopted in order to bring U.S. standards in line with those of the
International Accounting Standards Board, which required option
expensing as of February 2004.9
2 4 Id. at 42-43.
25 Id. at 41.
26 Id. at 43-44.
27 Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 123 (revised 2004): Share-Based Payment, at i (Dec. 2004).
28 Id. at ii.
29 id.
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While these are sensible justifications, a fourth factor not
specifically mentioned in the text of FAS 123(R) may have had the greatest
influence on the FASB's decision. Proponents of expensing highlighted its
potential to discourage massive option grants and thereby reduce the
likelihood of scandals similar to those at Enron and WorldCom. 30 The
apparent link between options and fraud resulted in increased support for
mandatory expensing as part of a broad regulatory effort to discourage
corporate misconduct.31
III. ANALYZING THE MAJOR ARGUMENTS AGAINST MANDATORY
STOCK OPTIONS EXPENSING
The debate over stock options expensing continues even though
companies are now required to comply with FAS 123(R). Members of the
entrepreneurial, venture capital, and technology sectors have been
particularly vocal critics of the FASB's decision to require companies to
report the fair value of options as an expense. The critics claim that the new
expensing requirements will: (1) impact recently started businesses more
harshly than established firms; (2) hurt the U.S. economy by discouraging
domestic job creation and reducing the productivity gains associated with
stock options; (3) fail to achieve the results predicted by supporters of
mandatory expensing; and (4) create additional opportunities for trial
lawyers to file class action lawsuits against U.S. companies. As the
following analysis shows, some of these arguments are quite persuasive and
others are less convincing.
A. FAS 123(R) Impacts Recently Started Businesses More Harshly than
Established Firms
Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists cite three ways in which FAS
123(R) will disproportionately harm start-ups. First, they note that start-ups
generally are more reliant on stock options to attract talented employees
than their larger competitors. Second, they argue that the forced expensing
of options will reduce earnings, making it more difficult for young
companies to obtain capital. Finally, they suggest that the costs of
complying with FAS 123(R) will be much more burdensome for small
businesses.
There is no question that start-ups, especially those in the
technology sector, have used stock options on a widespread basis. Such
businesses tend to be cash-strapped, so non-cash forms of compensation
such as options frequently are used to attract and retain talented employees
30 See Paul Krugman, Enron and the System, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2004, at A19.
31 Benjamin A. Templin, Expensing Isn't the Only Option: Alternatives to the FASB's
Stock Option Expensing Proposal, 30 J. CORP. L. 357, 364-65 (2005).
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who would otherwise choose to work for larger firms that pay higher
salaries. Today, because FAS 123(R) appears to make options less feasible,
the entrepreneurial community fears that it is at a competitive disadvantage
relative to larger companies. According to Mark Heesen of the National
Venture Capital Association, mandatory expensing means "stock options
will be too costly for most young companies to grant to all employees.,, 32 If
the high cost of options under FAS 123(R) triggers a widespread reduction
in option awards, start-ups presumably will find it more difficult to compete
in the marketplace for talent.33
Start-up companies that continue awarding options may find it
more challenging to raise money in the capital markets. Benjamin Templin,
a professor at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law, predicts that young
companies that use employee stock options will report lower earnings
because of the new expensing requirements, causing their share prices to
underperform.34 Such underperformance will in turn make it more costly
for them to raise additional capital. 35 Besides increasing the cost of capital
for firms that are already publicly traded, critics of FAS 123(R) claim
options expensing may delay or entirely prevent privately-held businesses
from going public. The premise of this argument is that the added expense
of options will make it more difficult for a firm to achieve the level of
profitability necessary for an IPO, forcing greater reliance on private equity,
which typically is the most expensive source of capital.36
In addition to the expenses associated with option awards,
companies that continue to grant options are likely to face higher
compliance-related expenses because of FAS 123(R). The additional audit
fees required to satisfy the FASB's expensing policy may be significant,
especially for small firms that use options liberally. The typical venture-
capital-backed start-up is likely to pay $30,000 - $100,000 to auditors and
consultants each year in an effort to conform to the new standard.3  Such
high compliance costs are difficult for smaller companies to absorb,
increasing the disadvantage they face relative to larger competitors
32 Supporting and Strengthening the Independence of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board. Oversight Hearing on Expensing Stock Options Before the S. Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of Mark Heesen, President,
National Venture Capital Association).
33 Templin, supra note 31, at 399.
3 4 
id.
35 ld.
36 Hearing on FASB and Small Business Growth Before the S. Banking Subcomm. on
Securities and Investment, 108th Cong. 9 (2003) (statement of Mark Heesen, President,
National Venture Capital Association).
37 Letter from Mark Heesen, President of National Venture Capital Association, to
Suzanne Bielstein, Director ofMajor Projects Financial Accounting Standards Board
(June 29, 2004), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/fasbcomment
letter.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2005).
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following the adoption of FAS 123(R). If compliance-related fees end up
being as high as the FASB's critics suggest, mandatory expensing will
create a significant burden for start-ups that award options to employees.
Otherwise, it is not clear that FAS 123(R)'s impact will be as negative as
the supporters of small business predict.
The argument that mandatory expensing will make small firms less
competitive and will increase their cost of capital assumes that options
expensing harms a company's financial condition. In reality, though, the
act of expensing options pursuant to FAS 123(R) only changes the
appearance of a firm's financial statements; information that once appeared
in a footnote is now a line item on the income statement.38 Cash flow,
which is the ultimate determinant of financial health, remains the same
whether or not options are expensed.
The fact that option expensing does not actually "cost" a business
any money suggests that investors should not be discouraged from investing
in firms that award stock options to employees. Private equity investors
who typically provide funding for small businesses are usually savvy
enough to recognize this. The same holds true for most of the investors
who purchase shares in an initial public offering. Moreover, investor
interest in a young company is likely driven by expectations about the
future rather than current results. Thus, the entrepreneurial community's
widespread concern about options expensing may be overblown. If audit
fees incurred because of FAS 123(R) do not spiral out of control, it appears
quite possible that start-ups will be able to continue awarding options
without jeopardizing their financial well-being and their ability to raise
capital.
B. FAS 123(R) Will Hurt the U.S. Economy by Discouraging Domestic Job
Creation and Reducing the Productivity Gains Associated with Stock
Options
Critics of FAS 123(R) also contend that the FASB's new stance on
40employee stock options will negatively impact the entire U.S. economy.
This is based on the theory that mandatory expensing will discourage the
38 Corey Rosen, Is Expensing the Y2K of Equity Compensation? (2004),
http://www.nceo.org/library/expensing.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2006).
39 See id.
40 See, e.g., Steve Hamm, Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, Will Expensing Cost the U.S.
Jobs?, Bus WiK, Dec. 22, 2003, at 40 (discussing technology executives' warnings that
options expensing will lead to greater outsourcing); The Economic Impact of Expensing
Stock Options, POLICY BACKGROUNDER (Employment Policy Foundation, Washington,
D.C.), September 17, 2002, at 4, www.savestockoptions.org/pdf/studies 03.pdf
(discussing the potential for reduced economic productivity as a result of mandatory
options expensing).
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use of options, resulting in the outsourcing of jobs to overseas markets 41
and decreased productivity.
42
For example, technology firms traditionally have been the biggest
users of options. 43 Industry leaders warn that forced expensing will result
in an undesirable chain reaction-companies will stop granting options to
rank-and-file employees, the employees will demand higher cash
compensation in lieu of options, and workforce expansion will ultimately be
shifted overseas where skilled workers are available at lower wages.44 John
Chambers, the CEO of Cisco Systems, is among those predicting that
mandatory expensing will promote outsourcing. Prior to the adoption of
FAS 123(R), he indicated that the FASB's decision would affect whether
his firm decided to grow its headcount in the U.S. or abroad.4 5
Even if mandatory expensing does not cause U.S. firms to hire
more workers overseas, opponents of FAS 123(R) claim that discouraging
the use of options will have negative consequences for the U.S. economy.
Studies suggesting that employee ownership through options has a highly
positive impact on individual firms and the national economy support this
argument. If options are curtailed because of the burdens associated with
expensing, this positive effect may disappear. Research by Joseph Blasi
and Douglas Kruse of Rutgers University showed that companies with
broad-based option plans increased average productivity six percent faster
46than firms without such plans. Moreover, the average return on assets at
firms with option plans increased sixteen percent more over a ten-year span
than the average public company's return on assets.4 7 A study conducted by
the Employment Policy Foundation ("EPF") indicated that discouraging
stock options could result in a loss of $2.3 trillion in output over the next
ten years. 48 The EPF estimates a reduction in output of this magnitude
could cost federal, state, and local governments as much as $563 billion in
tax revenue over the next decade.4 9
Similar to the claims that mandatory option expensing will
significantly harm small businesses, predictions that FAS 123(R) will be a
41 Steve Hamm, Amy Borrus & Mike McNamee, Will Expensing Cost the U.S. Jobs?,
Bus WK., Dec. 22, 2003, at 40.
42 The Economic Impact of Expensing Stock Options, POLIcY BACKGROUNDER
(Employment Policy Foundation, Washington, D.C.), September 17, 2002, at 4,
www.savestockoptions.org/pdf/studies 03.pdf.
43 Louis Lavelle, Time to Start Weighing the Options, Bus WK., Jan. 17, 2005, at 32.
44 Hamm et. al, supra note 41, at 40.
45 id.
46 JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., IN THE COMPANY OF OWNERS: THE TRUTH ABOUT STOCK
OPTIONS (AND WHY EVERY EMPLOYEE SHOULD HAVE THEM) 171 (2003).
47 id.
41 SaveStockOptions.org, Fact Sheet: Protecting Employee Ownership,
http://savestockoptions.org/resourcesfactsheet.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2005).
49 -
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major setback for the U.S. economy may be overstated. Many companies
that reduce or eliminate their option programs will likely award alternative
forms of equity-based compensation such as restricted stock.50 Thus, the
productivity gains associated with employee ownership are not likely to
disappear altogether.
Furthermore, it is quite possible that the talk of moving jobs
overseas was nothing more than a hollow threat, concocted by corporate
leaders who were searching for leverage in the options expensing debate.
For example, Cisco's CEO made his comments about outsourcing in the
midst of a last-minute effort to encourage Congress to override the FASB's
expensing requirements. 51 Considering this context, it seems reasonable to
conclude that the economic impact of FAS 123(R) may not be as dire as
predicted.
C. FAS 123(R) Will Fail to Achieve the Results Predicted by Supporters of
Mandatory Expensing
Following the release of FAS 123(R), FASB Chairman Robert Herz
stated that the new standard would "provide investors and other users of
financial statements with complete and unbiased information. ,52 Fellow
FASB member G. Michael Crooch added that mandatory options expensing
would improve the "relevance, reliability, and comparability" of corporate
financial data.53 These comments reflect the goals behind the FASB's
decision to require expensing, yet critics of the plan claim it will not
enhance the reliability and comparability of financial statements. Critics
also argue that mandatory expensing will fail to achieve another objective
not specifically mentioned by Herz and Crooch -the reduction of corporate
fraud.
1. FAS 123(R) Will Not Improve the Reliability and Comparability
of Corporate Financial Reports
Opponents of FAS 123(R) argue that the option valuation models
endorsed by the FASB are not designed to price employee stock options
and, therefore, do not provide reliable cost estimates for such option
awards. Burton Malkiel and William Baumol, professors of economics at
50 See Ruth Simon and Joann S. Lublin, Options May Become Perk of Past: Change in
Accounting Rule Could Reduce the Appeal Of [sic] Offering, Getting Grants, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 1, 2004, at D2.
51 See Hamm et al., supra note 41, at 40.
52 Carrie Johnson, FASB Orders Options Counted as Expenses, WASH. POST, Dec. 17,
2004, at El.
53 id.
54 See William A. Sahiman, Expensing Options Solves Nothing, HARv. Bus. REV., Dec.
2002, at 90, 96.
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Princeton University and New York University, respectively, cite the
Black-Scholes formula as an example of a popular valuation model that
produces suspect results when used to calculate options expenses pursuant
to FAS 123(R). 55 This formula, designed to price short-term market-traded
56
options, is a poor predictor of prices when applied to long-term options.
This is a significant problem because employee stock options generally
have durations of five to ten years, far longer than the six-month duration of
a typical market-traded option. Furthermore, employee stock options
possess characteristics that should negatively affect price, but these
characteristics are not accounted for in the Black-Scholes pricing formula.58
The inability to exercise prior to vesting and the inability of employees to
hedge their options are two such characteristics.5 9  All of this leads
professors Malkiel and Baumol to conclude that Black-Scholes and similar
pricing models do not accurately represent the fair value of employee stock
60options. Consequently, income statements that include options expenses
are not necessarily more reliable than those that do not.
Critics of FAS 123(R) also note that the comparability of the
options expenses shown on income statements is undermined by the
FASB's failure to prescribe a specific valuation method and by the
significant assumptions that must be made in calculating option values.
The lack of a standardized pricing model means that identical firms can
legitimately report substantially different expenses if they use different
formulas to determine the fair value of their option awards. 61 Likewise,
similar firms will report significantly different options expenses if they do
not make the same input assumptions when using the pricing models.
62
Unless investors are able to unravel the differences in the valuation methods
used and the assumptions made by the firms, it will be difficult to compare
their results.63
The ease with which companies can manipulate their options
expenses by changing their input assumptions is already apparent. One of
the simplest ways for companies to lower their costs is to reduce the
64
volatility estimates used to value options. In 2004, 210 companies in the
Russell 1000 Index trimmed their volatility estimates, lowering their
55 See, Burton G. Malkiel & William J. Baumol, Stock Options Keep the Economy
Afloat, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2002, at A18.
56 id.
57 jar
58 id.
59 jd.
60 id.
61 Hassett et al., supra note 7, at 58.
62 Jane Sasseen, Stock Options: Old Game, New Tricks, Bus. WK., Dec. 19, 2005, at
34.
63 id.
64 See Elizabeth MacDonald, A Volatile Brew, FORBES, Aug. 15, 2005, at 70.
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options expenses by a quarter, or $1.4 billion. It is not yet clear how
many companies used this same tactic in 2005, but investment researchers
expect that the release of year-end financial reports will reveal widespread
adoption of lower volatility estimates.66
In addition to reducing volatility estimates, companies also are
lowering their reported expenses by accelerating the vesting of options.
Between July and November of 2005, the number of firms using
accelerated vesting to trim option expenses increased from 234 to 439.
67
Accelerated vesting will likely cut more than $4 billion from these firms'
68
option expenses in 2006 and later years.
The use of lower volatility estimates and accelerated vesting has
prompted Bear Stearns analyst Christopher Senyek to agree with critics of
the FASB who question the usefulness and reliability of option expenses
reported pursuant to FAS 123(R). He refers to such tactics as "smoke and
mirrors" and warns "options expenses could be understated for years
ahead .,69
Overall, the critics of mandatory expensing make a very good point
about FAS 123(R)'s failure to significantly improve the reliability and
comparability of corporate financial statements. Forcing firms to report
option expenses may increase the extent to which income statements reflect
economic reality. This increase is relatively small, however, because of the
shortcomings of the prescribed option valuation models. It is doubtful that
Black-Scholes or other methods designed to price exchange-traded options
can accurately value employee stock options, and the flexibility of input
assumptions adds to the uncertainty of reported expenses. Until a more
precise valuation model is developed and approved by the FASB, the
reliability and comparability of options expenses will be somewhat
questionable.
2. FAS 123(R) Will Not Reduce the Incidence of Corporate Fraud
According to the National Center for Employee Ownership, the
number of companies providing options for rank-and-file workers may
decline by as much as one-third in coming years due to the institution of
mandatory expensing. 70 Many proponents of FAS 123(R) see this as a
positive development that will eventually reduce the incidence of corporate
fraud. 7 Critics of the FASB, however, argue that changes in the way that
companies account for options will not materially affect the incidence of
65 id.
66 Sasseen, supra note 62, at 34.
67 id.
68 id.
69 id.
70 Simon et al., supra note 50, at D2.
71 Sahlman, supra note 54, at 96.
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fraud. One reason for this is that option grants for executive-level
employees are likely to remain quite common even if option awards for
rank-and-file workers are dramatically reduced. 72
Harvard Business School Professor William Sahlman argues that
the potential for corporate fraud will not decline even if executives stop
receiving options. He believes that all performance-based compensation
systems have the potential to encourage cheating. 73 Thus, the incentive to
engage in corporate fraud is likely to remain if companies provide high-
ranking employees with alternatives to options such as restricted stock.
According to Professor Sahlman, "Only ethical management, sensible
governance, adequate internal control systems, and comprehensive
disclosure will protect the investor against disaster.
' 74
This point is well taken. Corporate fraud is far more attributable to
executives who lack integrity than the options held by those executives.
Even if one assumes that stock options create incentives to engage in
fraudulent activities, FAS 123(R) is not necessarily a viable solution to this
problem. Mandatory expensing may encourage smaller option awards, but
if it also results in larger grants of restricted stock, integrity-challenged
corporate executives will still have considerable incentive to manipulate
stock prices.
D. FAS 123(R) May Result in Increased Litigation
The flexibility of option pricing models and the uncertainty of the
expense figures they generate have fueled speculation that FAS 123(R) will
result in increased litigation. Craig Barrett, the CEO of computer chip
maker Intel, predicts that "a rule that requires the expensing of stock
options when no one knows how to do it accurately" will be a boon for trial
lawyers.75 Barrett's concern is that FASB has mandated options expensing
without providing a specific method for calculating such expenses, making
it easy for plaintiffs to allege that a company misstated its earnings.
In the process of valuing its option awards, a company has to make
two fundamental decisions that leave it vulnerable to shareholder lawsuits.
First, a firm must decide to use a particular options pricing model. As time
passes, shareholders may allege that the chosen model is less accurate than
other models available to the firm and is resulting in misleading statements
76
of earnings. Second, a firm must decide how to apply the chosen pricing
model. This involves making a series of input assumptions so that the
72 Simon et al., supra note 50, at D2.
7, Sahlman, supra note 54, at 95.
74 Id.
75 Craig R. Barrett, More Options for Trial Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2004, at
A14.
76 Hassett et al., supra note 7, at 58.
56 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 1:43
JOURNAL
model can place a value on options. The inherent uncertainty of these
assumptions creates an opportunity for shareholders to file lawsuits
claiming that the firm is manipulating input values in an effort to lower its
options expense and inflate net income.7 7
Larry Ribstein, a professor at the University of Illinois College of
Law, believes such lawsuits are likely once shareholders and plaintiffs'
attorneys begin analyzing how companies calculate their options expenses.
According to Ribstein, "Recording the expense of options is not entirely
straightforward and, arguably, is more confusing than simply disclosing the
amount of options in footnotes to financial statements. . . . [I]f the
disclosure rules are unduly complex or unclear, firms might face a risk of
securities fraud liability, which could discourage the use of options."' 8
Even if shareholders have little chance of prevailing in court by
claiming that a firm used inappropriate options expensing methods to
misstate its earnings, aggressive plaintiffs' attorneys are not likely to be
deterred from filing such lawsuits when there is the potential to settle out of
court. This is why Intel's Barrett and other business leaders are concerned
about the legal ramifications of FAS 123(R). Companies often settle
seemingly frivolous claims in order to avoid the distractions and negative
publicity associated with lawsuits, and the FASB's relatively vague
guidelines for options expensing appear to give trial lawyers another
opportunity to extract settlements.7 9
Time will tell whether predictions of increased litigation are
correct, but the FASB's critics have a good point. The flexibility and
uncertainty of the expensing process create plenty of room for second-
guessing, and trial lawyers are adept at using complex regulatory regimes to
their advantage. Interestingly, the business community made similar
predictions when the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002.80 Now, four
years later, those forecasts appear increasingly accurate. An overwhelming
majority of the 176 class action lawsuits filed in 2005 accused companies of
violating Sarbanes-Oxley. Eighty-nine percent alleged misrepresentations
of financial documents and eighty-two percent alleged false forward-
looking statements."'
Both Sarbanes-Oxley and FAS 123(R) create significant disclosure
requirements for U.S. corporations. Consequently, it is not unreasonable to
expect trial lawyers to challenge companies' options expensing methods
77 id.
78 Larry E. Ribstein, Market v. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud. A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 45-46, n. 245 (2002).
79 Hassett et al., supra note 7, at 58.
80 See Editorial, Reform Corporate Reform, RED HERRING, Oct. 2002, at 19; Carol A.N.
Zacharias, Sarbanes Oxley May Have Big Impact on D&O Litigation, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, Dec. 2, 2002, at 10.
81 Editorial, Class-Action Sarbox, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at A6.
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just as they are currently questioning firms' conformance to the standards
imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley.
IV. EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS IN A POST-FAS 123(R) WORLD
Whether or not they want to, companies must face the reality of
mandatory options expensing. Many firms have responded to the FASB's
new expensing requirements by dramatically scaling back the number of
options they award. However, the investment industry's reaction to
mandatory expensing suggests such drastic changes may not be necessary.
Instead, companies should adjust to FAS 123(R) by finding legitimate ways
to reduce their reported option expenses and considering alternative forms
of incentive compensation.
A. The Initial Reaction to FAS 123(R). Corporate America Is More
Concerned About Mandatory Expensing than Wall Street
The arrival of mandatory options expensing has coincided with a
notable decrease in the number of corporations using stock options to
compensate employees. A survey conducted by Lehman Brothers found
that companies in every industry awarded fewer stock options in 2005.82
The survey results suggested that the use of option compensation will
decline in 2006, as well.8 3 This trend appears to be motivated by three
primary factors - the negative perception associated with lower earnings,
the costs of regulatory compliance, and the threat of lawsuits due to the
inherent uncertainty of expense calculations.
The diminishing popularity of options is readily apparent at
America's largest firms. Companies included in the Standard & Poor's 500
stock index issued $80 billion in stock options in 2002. Ira Kay, head of the
compensation consulting division of Watson Wyatt Worldwide, predicts
this figure will fall by fifty percent by 2010 as firms scale back eligibility
for option awards8 4  All told, up to forty percent of publicly held
companies are reconsidering broad-based option plans, and more than thirty
85percent may discontinue their option plans within a few years.
The move away from options is particularly evident in the
technology sector, where companies traditionally have been very generous
in granting options to employees. Half of the technology firms
participating in a study by consulting firm Towers Perrin indicated that they
were planning to reduce the aggregate number of stock options awarded
82 Louis Lavelle, Are Options Headedfor Extinction?, Bus. WK., May 2, 2005, at 12.
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during 2005. 6 A Deloitte & Touche survey of the technology industry
yielded similar results; it found that sixty percent of participating firms
were planning widespread reductions of option grants."
While corporate America appears wary of options following the
adoption of FAS 123(R), Wall Street analysts and institutional investors,
the most frequent users of financial statements, seem far less concerned
about the impact of mandatory options expensing. The addition of charges
for options will depress earnings, but it is not clear that stock prices will
follow suit. According to Credit Suisse accounting specialist David Zion,
the earnings of the companies in the Standard & Poor's 500 will decrease
an average of three percent following the adoption of FAS 123(R)-
compliant accounting practices.8s The sectors of the economy that use
options more extensively will have a more pronounced decrease. For
example, Goldman Sachs analyst Rick Sherlund predicts that the earnings
of software firms will decrease an average of twenty percent during fiscal
2006.8'
Although corporate bottom lines will shrink because of options
expensing, the impact on stock prices following the implementation of FAS
123(R) may be relatively minimal. Most firms have not included options
expenses in their income statements until recently, but they have provided
estimates of such expenses in the footnotes to their financial statements. 90
Thus, analysts have been able to evaluate the financial impact of employee
stock options for quite some time. As a result, many market experts argue
that the new expensing standard is a non-event because option costs are
already factored into stock prices. 9 1 A Towers Perrin study that tracked the
share prices of 335 companies that voluntarily expensed options between
April 2, 2001, and August 14, 2003, supports this argument. 92 The study
showed that the average stock price of firms announcing decisions to
86 Towers Perrin Monitor, Tech Companies Scale Back Use of Stock Options,
http://www.towersperrin.com/hrservices/webcache/towers/TP Monitor/jsp/showdoc.jsp
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expense options did not vary significantly from the movement of the 900
companies making up the S&P 500 and MidCap 400 indices.
B. Learning to Live with FAS 123(R)
A company that continues granting options can minimize the pain
of complying with FAS 123(R) by taking steps to limit the cost of its
options program. For example, a firm can reduce the exercise period on the
options it grants to employees. 94  By reducing the traditional ten-year
exercise period on an option five years, a firm reduces the accounting
charge associated with the option as well. 95 This is because the term of an
option is a mandatory component of pricing models. 96 The downside of
reducing an option grant's exercise period is that doing so also reduces an
employee's incentive to stay with the firm.
Stipulating the maximum gain employees can realize on options
can minimize the accounting charge resulting from option awards. 97 Like
reducing the duration of options, placing a ceiling on gains somewhat
undermines the rationale behind granting options. However, firms make
this trade-off if they want to provide options to their employees without
incurring burdensome options-related expenses.
Firms that decide to reduce or eliminate their options programs can
reward employees with other forms of performance-linked compensation.
Many companies have decided to grant shares of restricted stock to
employees instead of options. Microsoft is perhaps the most prominent
firm to take this step.98  Restricted shares are outstanding shares of a
company's stock that are subject to forfeiture and cannot be sold for a
certain period of time. Employees who leave a firm prior to the expiration
of the forfeiture period lose ownership of their restricted shares. Grants of
restricted stock create incentives similar to those created by stock options.
They tie an employee's compensation to company performance and give the
employee incentive to stay with the firm until the forfeiture period lapses. 99
In the past, restricted stock awards were relatively rare because, unlike
options, they had to be expensed. Now that the playing field has leveled,
they are becoming more common. The advantage of awarding restricted
93 Id.
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stock instead of stock options is that the reported expense tends to be lower
and is easier to calculate than the expense associated with options.' 00
C. A Look at the Future
As firms begin complying with FAS 123(R), the realization that
stock option expensing is here to stay has fueled a search for more user-
friendly option valuation models. Thus far, the SEC has rejected proposed
alternatives to the guidelines set forth by the FASB. Nevertheless, the
agency appears willing to consider suggestions for making options
expensing a more straightforward process.
Much of the effort to find alternatives to the Black-Scholes and
binomial methods has focused on the development of a market-based
pricing system. Financial experts have argued that options expensing is
fraught with uncertainty largely because there is not a market that can
establish the true value of employee stock options. Cisco Systems, one of
the leading grantors of stock options, sought regulatory approval for a
possible solution to this problem in May 2005.101 Cisco's proposal,
developed by investment bank Morgan Stanley, called for the creation of a
market for derivative securities linked to employee stock options. 102
Cisco's plan failed to win the approval of the SEC, but the rejection
was not a complete loss for the critics of FAS 123(R)'s approach to options
expensing. 10 3 In his response to Cisco's proposal, SEC Chief Accountant
Donald Nicolaisen did not reject outright the possibility of using financial
derivatives to price options. 104  Moreover, the SEC's decision was
accompanied by pledges from agency officials to engage in a broader
dialogue with companies and investors about improving the options
valuation process. 105  Thus, there is reason to believe a more reliable
alternative to current options expensing methods will eventually be
developed and approved.
V. CONCLUSION
It will likely be several years before the impact of FAS 123(R) is
fully understood. This new regulation certainly has shortcomings, yet the
business community may not have as much reason to fear mandatory
expensing as some have suggested. Even though options expenses reduce a
100 Supra note 83, at 6.
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company's reported net income, such expenses do not alter the financial
condition of the firm. This is because options expensing is an accounting
function that does not actually cost the firm any money. Studies showing
that stock prices generally do not react when firms begin reporting options
expenses reveal the minimal financial impact of mandatory expensing. This
suggests that companies should not be concerned that the reduction in net
income will hinder their ability to raise capital.
Nevertheless, FAS 123(R) has notable flaws that may overshadow
the benefits of increased disclosure in the long run. The option valuation
models prescribed by the FASB were not designed to price employee stock
options. As a result, they are difficult to use and yield results that are not
always reliable. Moreover, the complexity of the valuation process is likely
to result in significant audit fees and other compliance-related costs for
firms that continue to award options. Finally, mandatory expensing is
likely to encourage increased litigation because the uncertainty of the
expensing process makes it relatively easy to allege that a company
misstated its option costs.
Despite these shortcomings, the SEC firmly backs FAS 123(R).
Companies are recognizing this and learning to live with mandatory
expensing. Some are replacing their option awards with alternative forms
of incentive compensation; others are adjusting their option plans in order
to reduce reported expenses; and virtually all of them are hoping for the
development and approval of a simpler, more effective valuation process.
The emergence of such a model might be the key to finally ending the
options expensing controversy.

